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Responses to delayed rewards vary widely across individuals and have important implications for 
personality and temperament. Animals may avoid delayed rewards because the future is uncertain. 
Therefore, expectations about receiving a future reward should influence the response to delayed 
payoffs.  Here, we offered bonobos (Pan paniscus) a delayed gratification task in which food 
accumulated over time.  Once subjects chose to consume the reward, food stopped accumulating. We 
tested their willingness to wait with a reliable and an unreliable experimenter to vary the subjects’ 
expectations that they would receive the food.  Subjects waited less often with the unreliable 
experimenter but showed individual differences in the degree to which reliability generalized across 
experimental tasks.  These data suggest that the expectations generated about the likelihood of 
receiving future rewards influence how individuals balance current and future needs. 
 
All organisms face tradeoffs between immediate and future rewards. 
Accept the available mate or seek out a more attractive one?  Raise offspring in the 
current environment or wait for more prosperous conditions?  Stop to eat this piece 
of food or keep searching for a richer patch?  The way in which individuals choose 
to balance rewards over time, or make intertemporal choices (Read, 2004; Stevens, 
2010), can therefore influence many biologically important functions, ranging 
from reproductive success to foraging efficiency.  One of the central paradoxes in 
the study of intertemporal choice is why most humans and animals seem to prefer 
immediacy to more delayed outcomes with higher value (Stevens & Stephens, 
2009).  This may occur because the future is uncertain: delayed outcomes may not 
come to fruition.  Indeed, uncertainty relates to intertemporal choice both in terms 
of the psychology underlying preferences (Green & Myerson, 2004; Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991) and evolutionary models of 
how decision makers should choose (Kacelnik, 2003; Stevens & Stephens, 2009).  
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However, few studies have clearly demonstrated a causal relationship between the 
probability of receiving rewards and intertemporal choice.  Consequently, 
understanding the role of uncertainty in temporal preferences—as well as why 
individuals differ in their response to uncertainty—will advance our understanding 
of intertemporal choice at both the proximate and ultimate level. 
In one of the first studies to relate uncertainty and intertemporal choice, 
Mahrer (1956) examined the role of expectancy on delayed reinforcement in 
children.  Here, expectancy refers to building a likelihood of receiving a reward. 
To generate expectancy, Mahrer had children interact with one of three 
experimenters that varied in his/her reliability, or probability of delivering a 
reward.  In the ‘high-reliability’ condition, over four sessions, the experimenter 
fulfilled the promise to bring a toy to the child on the following day.  In the ‘low-’ 
and ‘medium-reliability’ conditions, the experimenter fulfilled the promise in zero 
or two of the four sessions.  Following this expectancy-generating phase, the 
experimenter then offered each child the choice between an immediate reward and 
a more preferred but delayed reward.  The children generalized the information 
about the reliability of the experimenter to this choice phase.  As reliability 
decreased, the children chose the delayed reward in 76%, 42%, and 25% of the 
trials.  Thus, the children learned about the reliability of the experimenters and 
used this information about uncertainty when making choices regarding the future. 
Although Mahrer’s (1956) work suggests a role for uncertainty in 
intertemporal choice, whether these effects extend beyond human verbal 
interactions remains unclear.  Here we tested whether an expectation about 
uncertainty influences intertemporal choice in bonobos (Pan paniscus), a species 
whose temporal preferences (Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007) and responses 
to uncertainty in payoffs (Heilbronner, Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2008) 
have both been studied.  Subjects participated in a standard delayed gratification 
task (also called a delay maintenance or food accumulation task, Pelé, Dufour, 
Micheletta, & Thierry, 2010; Toner & Smith, 1977) previously used by Beran and 
colleagues (Beran, 2002; Beran & Evans, 2006; Beran, Savage-Rumbaugh, Pate, & 
Rumbaugh, 1999).  In their paradigm, an experimenter typically placed a bowl in 
front of subjects and then placed single rewards in the bowl one-by-one until either 
the subject reached into the bowl or all rewards had been placed into the bowl.  At 
that point, the subject could access the bowl of rewards.  Once the subject reached 
into the bowl, however, the experimenter stopped distributing rewards.  Therefore, 
with increased wait times, subjects could obtain larger quantities of reward, so the 
amount of time subjects waited represented a measure of their willingness to delay 
gratification.  By introducing into this paradigm a potential risk of not receiving 
the rewards, we examine how uncertainty plays a role in intertemporal choice. 
To manipulate expectancy, we varied the reliability of experimenters in an 
introductory period before offering the bonobos any intertemporal choices.  The 
low-reliability experimenter began a session by offering the subject a highly 
valued food item but then pulling it away from the subject, thereby preventing the 
subject from consuming the food.  After this pre-feeding period, the low-reliability 
experimenter conducted a standard experimental delayed gratification session with 
the bonobo.  In contrast, the high-reliability experimenter began a session by 
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offering the subject food but followed through in providing the food before 
conducting a standard experimental session.  With this manipulation, we can assess 
whether the bonobos generalize reliability from the initial phase to the subsequent 
delayed gratification phase, preferring more immediate options in the presence of 
unreliable experimenters. 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Four bonobos from Zoo Berlin participated in this experiment: Simon (28 year old male), 
Santi (26 year old male), Vifijo (13 year-old male) and Opala (9 year-old female).  These four 
bonobos were housed together with the alpha female and her infant in a series of adjacent enclosures. 
Simon was hand reared by zookeepers, whereas the other subjects were reared by bonobos.  None 
had experienced similar experiments before, but they all experienced a “clicker” training regime 
conducted by a zookeeper in which they received food for behavioral responses needed for veterinary 
purposes.  The bonobos received fresh fruits and vegetables after the experimental task and had 
constant access to water. 
 
Materials 
 
We tested subjects individually in different compartments of their home cage.  The testing 
apparatus was similar to Beran (2002).  It consisted of one bowl (containing food rewards) and one 
circular mark on the floor (15 cm in circumference and 41 cm from the subject’s cage) in which food 
rewards were placed in front of the subjects.  The bonobos could easily reach their hands between the 
metal bars of their cage to access the circle (Figure 1).  The bonobos received grape halves (about 0.5 
g) as rewards because they were a highly preferred food item.  The experimenters used a stopwatch to 
measure time intervals and videotaped all trials for behavioral analysis.  Data were analyzed using R 
statistical software version 2.12.0 (R Development Core Team, 2010) and the plyr (Wickham 2010) 
and lattice (Sarkar 2008) packages.  The original document for this paper used Sweave (Leisch 2002) 
to embed the R code into the document, ensuring reproducible research (de Leeuw 2001).  Data and 
R code are available as supplementary materials. 
 
Training phase 
 
All sessions occurred between 0915 and 1130 h about five days a week, with one session 
per subject per day.  A ‘control’ experimenter tested subjects immediately after their clicker training 
in the morning.  In these trials the experimenter sat about 1 m from the subject’s cage and placed 
single grape halves from the bowl into the subject’s circle (Figure 1).  Initially there was no waiting 
period between placing the rewards, so the experimenter placed the rewards in the circle at a rate of 
about one per second (interreward interval = 1 s).  A daily session consisted of 8 trials with a 
maximum reward of 10 grape halves per trial and an intertrial interval of 30 s.  Once the subject’s 
hand crossed the line of the circle or after the 10 grapes had been placed, the experimenter covered 
the bowl with a lid and placed it behind her back, stopping the flow of rewards and initiating the 30 s 
intertrial interval.  If the subject did not place all received rewards into his/her mouth within the 30 s 
intertrial interval, the experimenter waited until 10 s after the subject placed the last reward into 
his/her mouth before beginning a new trial. 
After a subject completed two consecutive sessions of waiting for all of the 10 rewards in 6 
out of 8 trials, we incremented the interreward interval by 1 s for the next session.  We continued this 
procedure for each subject until he/she achieved an interreward interval of 5 s, which we used for the 
remainder of the experiment.  Two subjects (Vifijo and Opala) did not pass this criterion after 43 and 
47 sessions, respectively, so they did not advance to the experimental phase.  The other two subjects 
required 7 (Santi) and 15 (Simon) sessions to pass the criterion and begin the experimental phase. 
During the trials, the experimenter kept verbal remarks to a minimum and avoided eye contact with 
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the apes both when placing the grapes and during the intertrial intervals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental apparatus. Experimenters placed grapes in a circle within the bonobo's reach. 
Once the bonobo's hand crossed the circle, the experimenter stopped placing grapes. 
 
Acclimation phase 
 
After the subjects reached the training criteria for five days on the 5 s interreward interval, 
we introduced two new test experimenters—the low- and high-reliability experimenters—to the 
subjects by having them observe two training sessions.  After the initial encounters, the test 
experimenters participated in three pre-feeding sessions before subjects experienced their daily 
training session.  Only one experimenter conducted the pre-feeding session each day and the two test 
experimenters alternated, with the control experimenter testing in between the test experimenters 
(e.g., low-reliability, control, high-reliability, control, low-reliability, control, etc.) for a total of 12 
sessions (3 sessions for each test experimenter).  In these pre-feeding sessions, each experimenter 
placed a banana slice in her hand about 0.5 m above the feeding circle for about 10 s.  During this 
time, the experimenter alternated her gaze between the banana and the subject five times.  After 10 s, 
the control and high-reliability experimenters dropped the banana slice into the feeding circle.  In one 
randomly chosen trial the low-reliability experimenter gave the subject the banana; however, in the 
other five trials she took the banana away and placed it in another bowl.  Thus, the unreliable 
behavior of this experimenter introduced uncertainty into the decision-making context.  The high-
reliability experimenter, in contrast, was as reliable as the control experimenter, but like the low-
reliability experimenter was a novel person, thereby controlling for familiarity.  After waiting 10 s 
after the subject put the banana piece into his/her mouth, the test experimenter began another feeding 
trial until she completed six trials.  Following the pre-feeding period, the control experimenter 
conducted a standard delayed gratification task for all sessions.  A standard session consisted of 8 
trials with a 5 s interreward interval and a 30 s intertrial interval.  We counterbalanced the assignment 
of the test experimenter as a low- or high-reliability experimenter across subjects. 
 
Experimental phase 1: Generalized expectation 
 
In the experimental phase 1, we examined whether previous experience with reliable or 
unreliable experimenters would influence subject’s expectations about receiving the food in the delay 
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of gratification task.  To do so, we altered which of the three experimenters (control, low-reliability, 
or high-reliability) conducted the entire test session.  Each test experimenter conducted one session 
with each subject.  One control session was conducted between each experimental session, and the 
experimental session order alternated between test experimenters, with the initial session 
counterbalanced across subjects.  The control experimenter was present in the building for all 
sessions, but the test experimenters were only present for the experimental sessions. 
All experimental sessions began with a pre-feeding period as described above.  In the 
control and high-reliability sessions, the experimenters gave the subject six pieces of banana.  In the 
low-reliability sessions, the low-reliability experimenter gave the subject only one of six pieces of 
banana.  Afterwards, the control experimenter gave the subjects the remaining five pieces of banana 
to equate consumption across conditions.  Following this pre-feeding period, the experimenters 
conducted a regular delayed gratification session. 
 
Experimental phase 2: Social competition 
 
Next, we examined whether introducing a competitive element would alter the bonobo’s 
expectations about uncertainty in the delay of gratification task.  This phase was similar to phase 1, 
except the low-reliability experimenter gave food to a bonobo in a neighboring cage (in visual contact 
about 1-1.5 m away), instead of placing it in another bowl.  After this pre-feeding period, the 
experimenter conducted a delayed gratification session (with no visual contact with a neighbor).  
Both test experimenters conducted one session with each subject in a similar order as in phase 1. 
 
Experimental phase 3: Direct experience 
 
Finally, we examined whether direct experience with unreliable experimenters in the 
delayed gratification task would influence intertemporal choice.  Instead of a pre-feeding period, the 
control and high-reliability experimenters conducted standard delayed gratification session in which 
waiting to the end resulted in receiving 10 grape halves.  In the low-reliability session, the 
experimenter interrupted all trials by removing 5 grapes instead of placing the 8th, 9th or 10th grape 
(randomly selected) into the feeding circle.  After the removal, the experimenter waited for the 
intertrial interval and continued to the next placement up to 10 placements.  If the subject waited until 
the end of a trial, he received a maximum of four rewards (for expected values, see Table 1).  Both 
test experimenters conducted three sessions with each subject.  Test experimenters alternated the 
order of testing with the control sessions in between (as in the acclimation phase). 
 
Table 1 
Expected values for planning to stop after each food placement 
Number of 
placements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
          
 
Expected value 
of grapes (EV )  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 5.63* 4.85* 4 
*EV8 = (1-p8)8 + p82 = 5.63 and EV9 = (1-p8)(1-p9)9 + (1-p8)p93 + p8 2 = 4.85, where p8 
and p9 represent the probabilities of being interrupted in the eighth and ninth grape, respectively (p8 = 
0.4 and p9 = 0.38). 
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Results 
 
Phase 1: Generalized expectation 
 
In phase 1, we tested whether uncertainty in a pre-feeding period 
generalized to a subsequent delayed gratification task.  When aggregating the 
number of grapes before stopping across subjects (Table 2 and left panel in Figure 
2), we do not see a strong difference across experimenters.  When separated by 
trials and subject (left panel in Figure 3), however, experimenter condition did 
influence choice for one of the subjects.  Simon waited for 10 grapes in all trials 
with the control experimenter and in all but the first trial with the high-reliability 
experimenter.  Yet, in the last half of the session with the low-reliability 
experimenter, Simon stopped after only six or seven grapes.  Santi, in contrast, 
waited for all 10 grapes in all conditions with the exception of the first trials.  The 
median waiting responses did not differ between the control and high-expectancy 
experimenters.  Individual and aggregated descriptive statistics are shown in Table 
2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Choices aggregated over trials and subjects.  The number of grapes placed before stopping 
did not differ across the control, high-reliability, and low-reliability conditions in phases 1 
(Generalized Expectation) or 2 (Social Competition).  In phase 3 (Direct Experience), however, 
subjects stopped earlier in the low-reliability condition.  Lines in boxes represent medians, diamonds 
represent means, boxes represent 25-75% quantiles (interquartile range), and whiskers represent 1.5 
times the interquartile range. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for number of grapes before stopping in each phase 
Subject Phase Condition Median Mean Std. Dev. 95% CI Trials 
Simon 1 Control 10 10 0 0 16 
 1 High 10 8.88 3.18 2.66 8 
 1 Low 8.5 8.12 2.03 1.7 8 
 2 Control 10 9.81 0.75 0.4 16 
 2 High 10 9.88 0.35 0.3 8 
 2 Low 8.5 8.25 1.58 1.32 8 
 3 Control 10 9.92 0.45 0.13 48 
 3 High 10 9.62 1.84 0.78 24 
 3 Low 7.5 7.21 2.59 1.09 24 
Santi 1 Control 10 10.06 0.25 0.13 16 
 1 High 10 9.5 1.41 1.18 8 
 1 Low 10 8.88 3.18 2.66 8 
 2 Control 10 10 0 0 16 
 2 High 10 8.88 3.18 2.66 8 
 2 Low 10 10 0 0 8 
 3 Control 10 9.92 0.45 0.13 48 
 3 High 10 9.96 0.2 0.09 24 
 3 Low 8.5 8 1.77 0.75 24 
Combined 1 Control 10 10.03 0.18 0.06 32 
 1 High 10 9.19 2.4 1.28 16 
 1 Low 10 8.5 2.61 1.39 16 
 2 Control 10 9.91 0.53 0.19 32 
 2 High 10 9.38 2.25 1.2 16 
 2 Low 10 9.12 1.41 0.75 16 
 3 Control 10 9.92 0.45 0.09 96 
 3 High 10 9.79 1.3 0.38 48 
 3 Low 8 7.6 2.23 0.65 48 
 
Phase 2: Social competition 
 
 Phase 2 replicated phase 1 with one difference: in the pre-feeding phase, 
the low-reliability experimenter gave undelivered food to a nearby group mate.  As 
in phase 1, experimenter condition did not influence choice at the aggregate level 
(Table 2 and center panel in Figure 2), but one subject stopped early with the low-
reliability experimenter (center panel in Figure 3).  This is the same subject that 
stopped early in phase 1, and again the effect seemed to increase over the session. 
The median waiting responses did not differ between the control and high-
expectancy experimenters.  The other subject treated all experimenters similarly. 
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Figure 3.  Choices separated by subject and trial number.  Though Simon stopped early in all phases, 
Santi did not stop early until the direct experience of uncertainty in phase 3.  Phases 1 and 2 include 
one session, and phase 3 represents the mean over three sessions.  Dashed line represents optimal 
stopping point in phase 3. 
 
Phase 3: Direct experience 
 
In phase 3, we dispensed with the pre-feeding phase, and had subjects 
directly experience uncertainty in the delayed gratification task.  Here, in both the 
aggregate data (Table 2 and right panel in Figure 2) and in the individual data 
(right panel in Figure 3), subjects stopped earlier for the low-reliability 
experimenter than the other two experimenters.  In this phase, both subjects 
responded to uncertainty by stopping early with the low-reliability experimenter 
but not with the control or high-expectancy experimenter.  The mean (± 95% 
confidence intervals) number of grapes before stopping dropped from 8.9 ± 0.8 to 
6.1 ± 1.3 and 7.8 ± 0.9 across the three sessions. 
Given the levels of uncertainty faced with the low-reliability experimenter, 
we can calculate the expected value of stopping after each grape.  For instance, in 
this phase, the expected value of waiting for the tenth grape was no longer 10; 
instead, it was 4 because a subject did not receive 1 grape on the interrupted trial 
and then lost 5 grapes.  Table 1 gives the expected values of stopping after each 
grape, using the actual overall interruption probabilities experienced.  From these 
calculations, we see that stopping after seven grapes yields the highest expected 
value.  This approximates the number of grapes at which the bonobos stopped 
(right panel in Figure 3). 
 
Discussion 
 
Our data highlight two main points: uncertainty influences delayed 
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gratification and individuals differ in their responses to uncertainty.  To summarize 
the experimental results, one of the two bonobos generalized about an 
experimenter’s unreliability in the pre-feeding period with bananas to the delayed 
gratification task with grapes.  Namely, this bonobo became more impulsive (that 
is, began consuming grapes before all were distributed, thereby foregoing larger 
rewards) with an unreliable experimenter.  A similar pattern emerged in the second 
phase when we added social competition to unreliability: the same bonobo 
exhibited similar levels of impulsivity towards the low-reliability experimenter as 
he exhibited in the first phase, thus generalizing about uncertainty across tasks.  In 
the final phase, both subjects responded to the direct experience of uncertainty in 
the delayed gratification task.  When interrupted during a trial, both bonobos chose 
more impulsively, matching optimal choices for maximizing their expected food 
intake. 
This work provides evidence of uncertainty influencing intertemporal 
choices in animals. Though theoretical and empirical work relates uncertainty and 
intertemporal choice (Green & Myerson, 2004; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; 
Rachlin et al., 1991), previous direct tests have failed to find a connection.  
Notably, Henly et al. (2008) offered blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) a standard 
‘self-control’ task in which the birds chose between a smaller, sooner and a larger, 
later reward.  Henley and colleagues added a constant probability of interruption 
per unit of time delay such that, as delays increased, the probability of losing the 
reward increased.  Choosing longer delays increased the risk of not receiving the 
reward, so uncertainty positively correlated with time delay.  Despite time acting as 
a proxy for uncertainty, the blue jays did not choose the smaller, sooner option 
more as the interruption risk increased.  Rather, they either did not change their 
preferences across interruption rates or even slightly increased their preference to 
choose the larger, later option at higher interruption rates. 
In contrast to the Henly study, our data demonstrate that uncertainty does 
influence intertemporal choices in bonobos.  When uncertainty is embedded 
directly into the temporal task, both bonobos responded by reducing delayed 
gratification under uncertainty.  Interestingly, one of the bonobos even responded 
to the expectation of uncertainty by generalizing about an experimenter’s 
reliability from a non-temporal, non-choice task to an intertemporal choice task. 
Both the temporal element and the choice element differed across the pre-feeding 
and delayed gratification tasks.  Thus, like the children in Mahrer’s (1956) task, 
one bonobo passively acquired information about uncertainty associated with an 
individual in one context and applied it to a novel context in which information 
about uncertainty was potentially relevant.  Surprisingly, rather than starting off 
impulsive, this bonobo tended to start sessions in both phase 1 and phase 2 by 
waiting for the full amount of grapes and only became impulsive in the second half 
of trials with the low-expectancy experimenter.  This may have resulted from the 
sheer strength of previous reinforcement in this task.  Both subjects experience 
between 20-27 practice and acclimation sessions before beginning the test phases, 
so the impulsive response had to compete with an overlearned waiting response. 
To increase attention to the uncertainty associated with the pre-feeding 
task, we included a phase in which the low-reliability experimenter gave non-
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received food items to a social competitor (phase 2).  Surprisingly, this 
manipulation did not influence the choices of either subject: Simon stopped early 
at the same rate as in phase 1 and Santi continued to disregard the unreliability of 
this experimenter. There are at least two possible reasons for social competition not 
affecting choices. First, bonobos are a very tolerant species, showing food sharing 
and other cooperative behaviors (Fruth & Hohmann, 2002; Hare & Kwetuenda, 
2010; Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007), so perhaps the social 
competition was not as salient as it might be for other species such as 
chimpanzees.  Second, the social competition does not directly bear on the delayed 
gratification task.  It could be that both subjects already attended to the pre-feeding 
task in the first phase, so social competition did not increase attention further. 
The primary weakness of this experiment is, of course, the small sample 
size. Though the sample size is not uncommon in experimental studies of bonobos, 
we would like to see more bonobos tested.  Nevertheless, we do see differences 
between the individuals in this experiment.  First, we began the experiment with 
four subjects, but only two passed the training criterion.  The two that could not 
wait 5 s between grapes were the youngest and lowest ranking male and female of 
the group.  Second, we saw differences between the two subjects that completed 
the experiment.  One subject became more impulsive in the delayed gratification 
task in response to generalized unreliability, whereas the other subject showed no 
effect of unreliability until it directly applied to the delayed gratification task. 
One potentially interesting way to think about individual differences comes 
from the psychology of expertise literature (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Ericsson & 
Lehmann, 1996) in which researchers distinguish between capacity and strategy.  A 
capacity typically refers to the maximum ability to perform a mental task, whereas 
a strategy is a set of actions used to accomplish a task (VandenBos, 2006).  Much 
work in psychology attributes individual differences to differences in capacity, 
where it is treated as a fixed, rather hard-wired trait.  However, many individual 
differences may result from applying different strategies.  For instance, in our 
experiment, one might postulate that one bonobo did not respond to unreliability in 
phases 1 and 2 because he could not generalize across contexts (he lacked the 
capacity).  Yet, he may have had the capacity to generalize but simply did not 
employ the strategy of becoming more impulsive because the contexts differed 
(namely, there was actually no unreliability in the delayed gratification task).  In 
our case, this strategy actually yielded a higher payoff. 
Another application of the capacity/strategy distinction is important for 
species organized in dominance hierarchies.  In many cases, most individuals of a 
species may have similar psychological capacities.  However, the nature of 
dominance hierarchies results in pressure to employ different strategies depending 
on where an individual falls on the hierarchy.  Subordinates, for instance, may have 
to demonstrate strong inhibitory control (Amici, Aureli, & Call, 2008; Aureli et al., 
2008) and patience (Stevens & Stephens, 2008) in the face of dominants because 
grabbing food in front of the dominant can be quite costly.  Nevertheless, in the 
absence of dominants, subordinates may act extremely impulsively to take 
advantage of the opportunity to feed without harassment (Stevens & Stephens, 
2002).  Thus, depending on the context, individuals will employ different 
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strategies. This may explain why our subordinate bonobos did not delay 
gratification enough to pass our training criterion. That being said, humans show 
enormous variation in delayed gratification (Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O’Donoghue, 2002; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).  In fact, decades of 
study have revealed that an individual’s tendency toward impulsivity or patience 
predicts such diverse life variables as likelihood of substance dependence, marital 
success, academic achievement, and cooperativeness (Ayduk et al., 2000; 
Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Harris & Madden, 2002; Mischel et al., 1989).  
Though not well studied yet, there likely is variation in delayed gratification in 
other animals that cannot be attributed to dominance status, sex, age, etc.  Recent 
work in the animal personality literature proposes adaptive reasons for individual 
differences (Dall, Houston, & McNamara, 2004; Sih, Bell, Johnson, & Ziemba, 
2004; Wolf, van Doorn, Leimar, & Weissing, 2007), but much work in this area 
remains. 
 
References 
 
Amici, F., Aureli, F., & Call, J. (2008). Fission-fusion dynamics, behavioral flexibility, and 
inhibitory control in primates. Current Biology, 18(18), 1415–1419. 
Aureli, F., Shaffner, C., Boesch, C., Bearder, S., Call, J., Chapman, C., ...Van Schaik, C. P. 
(2008). Fission-fusion dynamics: New research frameworks. Current 
Anthropology, 49(4), 627–654. 
Ayduk, O., Mendoza-Denton, R., Mischel, W., Downey, G., Peake, P. K., & Rodriguez, M. 
(2000). Regulating the interpersonal self: Strategic self-regulation for coping with 
rejection sensitivity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 776-
792. 
Beran, M. J. (2002). Maintenance of self-imposed delay of gratification by four 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and an orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus). Journal of 
General Psychology, 129(1), 49–66. 
Beran, M. J., & Evans, T. A. (2006). Maintenance of delay of gratification by four 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): The effects of delayed reward visibility, 
experimenter presence, and extended delay intervals. Behavioural Processes, 
73(3), 315–324. 
Beran, M. J., Savage-Rumbaugh, E., Pate, J. L., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (1999). Delay of 
gratification in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Developmental Psychobiology, 
34(2), 119–127. 
Cokely, E. T., & Kelley, C. M. (2009). Cognitive abilities and superior decision making 
under risk: A protocol analysis and process model evaluation. Judgment and 
Decision Making, 4(1), 20–33. 
Dall, S. R. X., Houston, A. I., & McNamara, J. M. (2004). The behavioural ecology of 
personality: Consistent individual differences from an adaptive perspective. 
Ecology Letters, 7(8), 734–739. 
Duckworth, A. L., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2005). Self-discipline outdoes IQ in predicting 
academic performance of adolescents. Psychological Science, 16(12), 939-944. 
Ericsson, K. A., & Lehmann, A. C. (1996). Expert and exceptional performance: Evidence 
of maximal adaptation to task constraints. Annual Reviews in Psychology, 47, 
273–305. 
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time 
preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 351–401. 
 - 110 - 
 
Fruth, B., & Hohmann, G. (2002). How bonobos handle hunts and harvests: Why share 
food? In C. Boesch, G. Hohmann, & L. F. Marchant (Eds.), Behavioural diversity 
in chimpanzees and bonobos (pp. 231–243). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Green, L., & Myerson, J. (2004). A discounting framework for choice with delayed and 
probabilistic rewards. Psychological Bulletin, 130(5), 769–792. 
Hare, B., & Kwetuenda, S. (2010). Bonobos voluntarily share their own food with others. 
Current Biology, 20(5), R230-R231. 
Hare, B., Melis, A. P., Woods, V., Hastings, S., & Wrangham, R. W. (2007). Tolerance 
allows bonobos to outperform chimpanzees on a cooperative task. Current 
Biology, 17(7), 619–623. 
Harris, A. C., & Madden, G. J. (2002). Delay discounting and performance on the 
prisoner’s dilemma game. Psychological Record, 52(4), 429-440. 
Heilbronner, S. R., Rosati, A. G., Stevens, J. R., Hare, B., & Hauser, M. D. (2008). A fruit 
in the hand or two in the bush? Divergent risk preferences in chimpanzees and 
bonobos. Biology Letters, 4(3), 246–249. 
Henly, S., Ostdiek, A., Blackwell, E., Knutie, S., Dunlap, A. S., & Stephens, D. W. (2008). 
The discounting-by-interruptions hypothesis: Model and experiment. Behavioral 
Ecology, 19(1), 154–162. 
Kacelnik, A. (2003). The evolution of patience. In G. Loewenstein, D. Read, & R. F. 
Baumeister (Eds.), Time and decision: Economic and psychological perspectives 
on intertemporal choice (p. 115-138). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Leeuw, J. de. (2001). Reproducible research: The bottom line (Department of Statistics 
Papers Series). Los Angeles: University of California-Los Angeles.  
Leisch, F. (2002). Sweave: Dynamic generation of statistical reports using literate data 
analysis. In W. Härdle & B. Rönz (Eds.), Compstat 2002—Proceedings in 
computational statistics (p. 575–580). Heidelberg: Physica Verlag. 
Mahrer, A. R. (1956). The role of expectancy in delayed reinforcement. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 52(2), 101–106. 
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. L. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. 
Science, 244(4907), 933–938. 
Pelé, M., Dufour, V., Micheletta, J., & Thierry, B. (2010). Long-tailed macaques display 
unexpected waiting abilities in exchange tasks. Animal Cognition, 13(2), 263-271. 
Prelec, D., & Loewenstein, G. (1991). Decision-making over time and under uncertainty: A 
common approach. Management Science, 37(7), 770–786. 
R Development Core Team. (2010). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical 
Computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria: 
http://www.R-project.org 
Rachlin, H., Raineri, A., & Cross, D. (1991). Subjective probability and delay. Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 55(2), 233–244. 
Read, D. (2004). Intertemporal choice. In D. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell 
handbook of judgment and decision making (pp. 424–443). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Rosati, A. G., Stevens, J. R., Hare, B., & Hauser, M. D. (2007). The evolutionary origins of 
human patience: Temporal preferences in chimpanzees, bonobos, and adult 
humans. Current Biology, 17(19), 1663–1668. 
Sarkar, D. (2008). Lattice: Multivariate data visualization with R. New York: Springer. 
Sih, A., Bell, A. M., Johnson, J. C., & Ziemba, R. E. (2004). Behavioral syndromes: An 
integrative overview. Quarterly Review of Biology, 79(3), 241–277. 
Stevens, J. R. (2010). Intertemporal choice. In M. D. Breed & J. Moore (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of animal behavior. Oxford: Academic Press. 
 - 111 - 
 
Stevens, J. R., & Stephens, D. W. (2009). The adaptive nature of impulsivity. In G. J. 
Madden & W. K. Bickel (Eds.), Impulsivity: The behavioral and neurological 
science of discounting (p. 361-387). Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Stevens, J. R., & Stephens, D. W. (2008). Patience. Current Biology, 18(1), R11–12. 
Stevens, J. R., & Stephens, D. W. (2002). Food sharing: A model of manipulation by 
harassment. Behavioral Ecology, 13(2), 393–400. 
Toner, I. J., & Smith, R. A. (1977). Age and overt verbalization in delay-maintenance 
behavior in children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 24(1), 123-128. 
VandenBos, G. R. (2006). APA dictionary of psychology. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Wickham, H. (2010). plyr: Tools for splitting, applying and combining data. (R package 
version 1.2.1). 
Wolf, M., van Doorn, G. S., Leimar, O., & Weissing, F. J. (2007). Life-history trade-offs 
favour the evolution of animal personalities. Nature, 447(7144), 581–584. 
 
